Two results follow from the standard workhorse model of tax competition. One is that tax competition between countries leads to underprovision of public consumption goods (see Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986) . The other that tax competition lowers capital taxes and may lead to less redistribution due to higher e¢ ciency costs of capital taxation. This paper embeds both public goods provision and redistribution in a single model framework, and shows that preferences for income redistribution may alter the standard result of under-provision of public goods under tax competition. JEL classi…cation: H2, F6, H4
Introduction
Two results follow from the standard workhorse model of tax competition. One is that tax competition between countries leads to underprovision of public consumption goods (see Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986) . The other that tax competition lowers capital taxes and may lead to less redistribution due to higher e¢ ciency costs of capital taxation. This paper embeds both public goods provision and redistribution in a single model framework, and shows that preferences for income redistribution may alter the standard result of under-provision of public goods under tax competition.
A simultaneous analysis of public goods provision and redistribution is important because public goods a¤ect households di¤erently. In this paper I di¤erentiate between two types of public goods: The …rst pertains to public goods that bene…t high-income earners more than low-income earners. Police services and highways are examples of public goods that bene…t rich people more. The second relates to public goods that bene…t low-income earners more than high-income earners. This type of public goods can include public provision of vaccination, public parks and public schools. Obviously, taxes to …nance public goods have distributional e¤ects as well. A third factor that has implication for income redistribution is that there may be a positive correlation of capital income and labor income, which has been largely ignored in the tax competition literature. 1 The correlation of earnings and wealth in the U.S., for example, is found to be 0:51 when retirees are excluded (Rodriguez et al., 2002) .
This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the interactions of redistribution and public goods provision under capital mobility. I use a standard two-country symmetric tax competition model, whereby benevolent governments tax labor income and capital to …nance public goods. Public goods can bene…t low-income people more or less than high-income ones. Furthermore, capital income and labor income are positively correlated. I derive the optimal redistribution of labor income and capital income as well as the optimal level of public goods provision. Capital mobility constraints the taxation of capital, leading to under-redistribution of capital income relative to labor income. The extent to which capital income is less redistributed relative to labor income is equal to the net welfare costs of capital mobility. The higher the capital mobility, the lower the optimal capital tax rate will be and the more unequal the net capital income is relative to net labor income. Consequently, the optimal level of income redistribution is lower.
The optimal level of public goods is determined by the marginal bene…t of providing them and the marginal costs of public funds. Sandmo (1998) shows that if public goods bene…t high-income earners more (less) than low-income ones, a lower (higher) level of public goods should be provided in order to achieve a better redistribution. Thus, public goods can be used as an instrument to counteract the negative e¤ect of capital mobility on redistribution. If capital mobility increases, the direct distributional e¤ect of public goods calls for a higher (lower) level of public goods, if public goods bene…t low-income earners more (less). On the other hand, due to the positive correlation of capital income and labor income, a less strong redistribution of capital income can be partly compensated by a stronger redistribution of labor income. As a result, taxing labor income becomes more bene…cial from a distributional viewpoint and the marginal costs of public funds decrease, which calls for a higher level of public goods. This is the opposite to the result in literature that capital mobility increases the costs of public goods provision. Combing two e¤ects, the optimal level of public goods is unambiguously increased by higher capital mobility, if public goods bene…t low-income earners more. For the case that public goods bene…t low-income earners less, the e¤ect of higher capital mobility depends on which of the two e¤ects dominates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the literature. The model setup is introduced in Section 3 and the optimal policy of the government is analyzed in Section 4. I derive in the …fth section the comparative statics of optimal policy w.r.t. capital mobility and discuss the results in Section 6. The last section concludes.
Literature review
There are two strands of literature on the welfare e¤ects of capital mobility. One strand focuses on the e¤ects of capital mobility on the provision of public goods and the other analyzes how capital mobility a¤ects income redistribution.
The literature on public goods provision normally applies a representative agent model and thus ignores the distributional aspect. By restricting tax instruments to capital tax, a lower level of public goods provision results when capital mobility increases the e¢ ciency costs of capital taxation (see Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Wilson, 1986 and Hoyt, 1991) . One wonders, however, whether public goods are still under-provided in the presence of other tax instruments. Using a representative agent model too, Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) analyze the optimal capital tax and labor tax to …nance public goods.
They show that both capital income and labor income are ine¢ ciently low taxed and public goods are under-provided when capital is mobile. The under-taxation of labor income results from its negative externality because of labor supply distortion and the interaction between labor market and capital market.
Most papers that analyze income redistribution use either models with individuals who di¤er only in capital income or workers vs. capitalists models. In Persson and Tabellini (1992) individuals di¤er in their capital income and the government is chosen by the median voter. Increasing tax competition reduces redistribution because capital taxation becomes more distortionary. However, anticipating this change, the median voter chooses a "further left" policy maker, who prefers more redistribution. Reduction in redistribution by capital mobility is therefore mitigated by a political e¤ect. Papers like Lopez, Marchand and Pestieau (1998) and Gabszewicz and van Ypersele (1996) use workers vs. capitalists models, showing that capital mobility reduces redistribution from capitalists to workers. Lejour and Verbon (1997) considers capital taxation to …nance public goods that only bene…t workers. Therefore, public goods can be interpreted as a transfer to workers. They show that over-provision of public goods can result, but due to the negative externality of capital taxation in growth. A stronger capital taxation reduces domestic saving and thus capital invested in foreign country, which lowers its growth rate.
Other studies analyze the optimal mix of capital tax and labor tax to …nance exogenous revenue requirement. When the e¤ects of factor income are considered, capital tax rate can be either increased or decreased by capital mobility. (see e.g. Hau ‡er, 1997 and Grazzini and van Ypersele, 2001 ).
In workers vs. capitalists model labor income and capital income are per de…nition negatively correlated 2 . However, income data show that they are positively correlated.
This fact is considered in Huber (1999) , which uses Mirrlees'approach to study the e¤ects of capital mobility on optimal redistribution from high-skilled to low-skilled individuals.
The paper shows that if high-skilled individuals own more capital than low-skilled, capital taxation has a positive externality by reducing income inequality in the foreign country.
The paper closest to ours is Ihori and Yang (2008) , which analyzes both redistribution and public goods provision under tax competition. They show that tax competition does not a¤ect the optimal level of public goods provision, but only reduces capital income redistribution. They assume that a lump-sum transfer (tax) is available to …nance public goods and they did not consider the possibility that public goods have distributional e¤ect. Consequently, providing public goods and redistribution can be separated. 
The model
In the setting of Gabszewicz and van Ypersele (1996) the two kinds of income are uncorrelated, since all individuals have the same labor income.
. Each individual in both countries supplies one unit time of labor. The labor income of an individual is thus w i h, whereby w i is the wage rate per e¢ ciency unit of labor in country i. A homogenous good is produced with the input of labor and capital. Following tax competition literature (Bucovetsky, 1991 and Hau ‡er 1997) , the production function is assumed to be quadratic:
is the capital intensity, i.e. capital investment per e¢ ciency unit of labor, in country i and K i denotes the total capital investment in country i, i 2 (A; B).
Factor market and product market are perfectly competitive, which implies that factor prices, i.e. wage rate w i and gross interest rate r i , are determined by capital intensity:
Capital is mobile between two countries, but labor is immobile. Investing in foreign country causes transaction costs of i = 1 2
(1 K i ) 2 , where 1 K i is the total amount of capital invested by residents of country i in country j, i; j 2 (A; B) and i 6 = j. Capital tax is source-based and ‡at at a rate of i per unit. Equilibrium on the capital market implies that the di¤erence between the net return to capital in both countries is equal to the marginal costs of transaction:
, the equilibrium capital intensity can be derived
For later references I derive the following derivatives:
Capital intensity in one country depends negatively on its own tax rate and positively on the other country's tax rate. A higher capital tax rate reduces the wage rate and increases the gross return to capital in its own country, and its e¤ects on the factor prices in the other country are exactly the opposite. The parameter determines the degree of capital mobility and thus the intensity of tax competition. The larger the , the higher the transaction costs and the smaller the negative e¤ect of capital tax increase on its own capital intensity.
Individuals derive utility from the consumption of the numeraire private goods c and public goods z:
The subscript kh denotes individuals with human capital h and capital endowment k.
The utility function is increasing and concave in both arguments, i.e. the …rst derivatives u c and u z are positive and the second derivatives u cc and u zz are negative. The cross derivative u cz can be either positive or negative. A positive derivative implies that private goods and public goods are complementary in consumption. They are substitutes if u cz is negative. The marginal rate of transformation between private goods and public goods is given by p.
To …nance public goods z, the government levies a ‡at rate tax t on labor income and a source-based unit tax on capital. For computational simplicity, it is assumed that only one individual in the export country invests in the foreign country 3 . The private consumption of all other individuals in country i are
The government is benevolent and maximizes a utilitarian welfare function:
The budget constraint of the government is
4 Optimal policy
In this section I derive the optimal policy of the government. Each country maximizes its welfare function by choosing tax rates and the level of the public goods, while taking the policy of the other country as given. In the symmetric Nash-equilibrium the two countries choose the same policy and there is no capital ‡ow between them. Since the two countries are identical, it is su¢ cient to analyze the optimal policy of one country. I will look at country A and the corresponding Lagrangian function is
whereby I use A to denote the Lagrangian multiplier which measures the shadow price for tax revenue. 4 The private consumption of the individual who invests in foreign country is c kh = (
; j 2 (A; B); i 6 = j and r i i < r j j .
Labor tax
The …rst-order-condition for labor tax rate t is
Following Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) , I de…ne the distributional characteristic of labor
, the negative normalized covariance between the marginal utility of private consumption and human capital endowment. It is zero if all individuals have the same income or if human capital is uniformly distributed. h indicates how e¤ective labor taxation is in changing income inequality. The higher h , the more unequal labor income and the more important is labor taxation in reducing income inequality. Using de…nition of h the …rst-order condition (9) can be rewritten as
where
The left-hand-side of equation (10) can be interpreted as the marginal costs of public funds (MCF), de…ned as the shadow price of tax revenue divided by the average marginal utility of private income (see e.g. Sandmo, 1998) . Since labor supply is assumed to be exogenous, there is no e¢ ciency costs of taxing labor income. However, taxing labor income a¤ects income distribution. Note that the assumption of a concave utility function and a utilitarian welfare function imply that the government has a distributive concern. Individual with higher private consumption has a lower marginal utility of consumption and features therefore a lower marginal welfare weight. If an individual endowed with higher human capital also exhibits higher private consumption, the distributional characteristic h is positive. In this case, taxing labor income reduces income inequality and increases the welfare on this account. As a result, MCF by taxing labor income is smaller than 1. If h is negative, MCF is larger than 1;
because taxing labor income reduces welfare by increasing income inequality. Since labor income and capital income are assumed to be positively correlated, it applies that h 0.
Capital tax
Maximizing (8) with respect to and imposing a symmetric Nash-equilibrium 5 yield (see Appendix A.1):
whereby I de…ne the distributional characteristic of capital income as k
. As for labor taxation, the MCF by means of taxing capital income depends on the distributional characteristic k . For a positive k , a marginal increase of capital tax rate increases welfare by reducing capital income inequality and the MCF is lower, and vice versa for a negative k .
However, taxing capital has additional welfare e¤ects due to capital mobility. The bracket term in the numerate on the right-hand-side of (11) gives the additional welfare e¤ects of capital tax by a¤ecting the private consumption of individuals. Taxing capital reduces capital intensity and increases the gross return to capital. This bene…ts capital holders, making them lose less than the tax increase. However, a lower capital intensity decreases wage rate and harms individuals by reducing their labor income. Both e¤ects are weighted by (1 k ) and (1 h ), respectively. With positive distributional characteristics, increase in gross return to capital is less welfare-improving, because it exaggerates capital income inequality. Similarly, decrease in wage income is less harmful for the reason that it mitigates labor income inequality. If these two welfare e¤ects are positive in total, taxing capital becomes less costly, apart from the positive distributional e¤ect k , and the MCF by taxing capital income becomes lower. If they are negative, the MCF becomes higher.
The bracket term in the denominator on the right-hand-side of (11) is the additional welfare e¤ect of capital tax by a¤ecting tax revenue. This revenue e¤ect is unambiguously negative, because a lower capital intensity and a lower wage rate reduces tax revenue, i.e. 5 After setting r A A = r B B , the resulting best-response function (11) is identical for both countries, which implies that there is a symmetric Nash-equilibrium. the tax revenue reduction t i
is positive. The stronger this negative revenue e¤ect, the more costly the capital tax and the higher the MCF. If capital is immobile, both bracket terms are equal to zero and equation ( Combining (10) and (11), it can be derived that
. (12) This equation gives the inequality of net capital income relative to that of net labor income in the optimum. If there is no capital mobility, equation (12) reduces to k = h .
Intuitively, if both taxes are non-distortionary, the marginal distributional e¤ects of both taxes should be equalized in the optimum, or in other words, changing the mix of capital tax and labor tax cannot improve income distribution.
With capital mobility, the distributional characteristics of capital taxation and labor taxation are not equalized any more. The right-hand-side of (12) is the net welfare costs of capital mobility. The …rst bracket term is the loss in tax revenue caused by capital out ‡ow. Multiplied by the MCF, which is equal to 1 h , it gives the welfare costs of tax revenue loss. The third bracket term is the welfare e¤ects of capital mobility by a¤ecting individual private income, which can be either positive or negative. To determine the sign of the net welfare e¤ect, I reformulate equation (12) by using (3) and substituting
Therefore, the net welfare costs of capital mobility is positive and k > h .
Because of the negative welfare e¤ect of capital mobility, the marginal distributional e¤ect of capital income is larger than that of labor income in the optimum, implying that net capital income is more unequally distributed than net labor income. If it was not for capital mobility, a higher level of redistribution could be achieved by a marginal revenue-neutral shift from labor tax to capital tax 6 . Therefore, capital mobility leads to a under-taxation of capital income relative to labor income and a higher income inequality. The larger the net welfare costs of capital mobility, the larger the di¤erence in marginal distributional e¤ects, and the lower the optimal level of redistribution. The net welfare costs are determined among others by the production function parameter b and the transaction costs parameter , both determining the responsiveness of equilibrium capital intensity to tax rate. The lower b and the lower , the more capital ‡ow is needed to reach the capital market equilibrium for a marginal increase of A , and therefore the larger the tax revenue loss and the higher the net welfare costs. Furthermore, the stronger the distributional concern and the more unequal capital endowment, the higher the k , the less the positive e¤ect of capital out ‡ow on gross return to capital is weighted and the higher the net welfare costs. The more important it is to redistribute capital income, the more costly the constraints capital mobility imposes on redistribution.
I formulate our results in Proposition 1:
The net welfare costs of capital mobility determine to which extent redistributing capital income is constrained relative to redistributing labor income. The more costly capital mobility, the less capital income is redistributed relative to labor income and the lower the level of optimal income redistribution.
Public goods provision
The …rst-order-condition for z is given by
This condition is similar to that in Sandmo (1998 ) multiplied by the price of public goods p. In optimum, the marginal welfare e¤ect of providing public goods is traded o¤ against the marginal costs of doing so.
Increasing capital mobility
In this section I discuss how higher capital mobility a¤ects the optimal capital tax rate and the optimal provision of public goods. To that end, I derive the comparative statics w.r.t. the transaction-cost parameter . A higher value of implies higher transaction costs and a lower degree of capital mobility. In case of a very large , capital becomes immobile.
For the derivation of the comparative statics I reformulate and combine the …rst-order-conditions of (8) to be
And using Cramer's rule, it can be shown that (see Appendix A.2.1 and Appendix A.2.2):
From the second-order-condition of the governmental optimization problem,
applies. Consequently, a higher increases the optimal capital tax rate, i.e. > 0. This is very intuitive: higher transaction costs reduce the responsiveness of capital intensity to capital tax rate and therefore decrease its net welfare costs. As a result, capital tax rate is optimally set higher.
In order to determine the sign of
@F 2 @ is the partial e¤ect of a higher capital tax rate on F 2 , while keeping public goods constant and adjusting labor tax rate accordingly 7 . The …rst two terms in equation (18) give the e¤ect on the marginal welfare gain of public goods provision E A revenue-neutral (for given z) increase of capital tax rate implies that labor tax rate has to be reduced 8 . If capital income is assumed to be more unequal than labor income at the initial equilibrium due to capital mobility (see proposition 1), a revenue-neutral shift from labor tax to capital tax reduces income inequality. A straightforward implication of a lower income inequality is that the distributional characteristic of labor income h decreases, because a lower income inequality reduces the variability of the marginal utility of consumption u c . For a perfectly equal distribution of income, h would be equal to zero.
Since the MCF is equal to 1 h , the MCF e¤ect of a higher capital tax rate is positive.
The sign of the welfare e¤ect in (18) depends on the sign of z , i.e. whether public goods bene…t the low-income individuals more.
If public goods have positive distributional e¤ect ( z < 0), it applies that
2). Consequently, the welfare e¤ect of a higher capital tax rate in equation (18) is negative. Because the MCF e¤ect is positive, it implies that @F 2 @ < 0 and dz d < 0. This means that higher capital mobility (a lower ) increases the 7 The …rst-order-conditions F 1 and F 2 determine the optimal capital tax rate and the optimal level of public goods simultaneously, while the optimal labor tax rate is pinned down by the governmental budget constraint. 8 We assume that the optimal capital tax rate is on the upward side of La¤er-curve, i.e. the denominator of (11) is positive. 
optimal level of public goods. Intuitively, higher capital mobility implies higher e¢ ciency costs of capital taxation. Thus, capital tax rate is reduced and income inequality becomes higher. Because public goods have positive distributional e¤ect, a higher level of public goods is needed to counteract the increasing income inequality (i.e. z becomes larger in absolute value). Moreover, the average bene…t of public goods provision increases as well. Both e¤ects together imply that the marginal welfare gain of public goods provision increases, which calls for a higher level of public goods. At the same time, a higher income inequality reduces the MCF, which also calls for a higher level of public goods. In particular, a higher income inequality increases the need for labor taxation to redistribute income, because labor income and capital income are positively correlated. The larger distributional gain of labor taxation reduces the MCF. As a result, if capital becomes more mobile, the optimal level of public goods is unambiguously higher.
If public goods bene…t high-income individuals more ( z > 0), the welfare e¤ect of a higher capital tax rate is positive, due to are not clear-cut. For distributional purpose, public goods should be reduced, because a higher income inequality worsens the negative distributional e¤ect of public goods. In addition, the average bene…t of public goods decreases as well. Both e¤ects lead to lower marginal welfare gain of public goods, which calls for a lower level of public goods. However, higher capital mobility reduces the MCF, which works in the opposite direction than the welfare gain e¤ect. How the optimal level of public goods changes depends therefore on which e¤ect dominates. Table 1 gives an overview of the e¤ects of higher capital mobility and the following proposition summarizes our results:
Proposition 2: If public goods bene…t low-income individuals more than high-income ones, higher capital mobility increases unambiguously the optimal provision of public goods. If public goods have negative distributional e¤ect, the e¤ect of higher capital mobility on the optimal level of public goods depends on which of the welfare e¤ect and the MCF e¤ect dominates.
Discussion
Our result for the case of a positive distributional e¤ect of public goods is exactly the opposite to the well-known result in tax competition literature that tax competition reduces the provision of public goods (see e.g. Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986 ). The latter is normally derived in a model with homogenous individuals, where public goods are only …nanced by capital taxation. Consequently, higher e¢ ciency costs of capital taxation implied by tax competition reduces capital tax rate and thus the provision of public goods. However, in a model with heterogenous individuals and more tax instruments this result does not necessarily hold any more.
There are two reasons why our result di¤ers. Firstly, by taking income redistribution into consideration, public goods provision is used as an instrument for income redistribution in addition to income taxation, as long as public goods bene…t individuals with di¤erent income di¤erently. Consequently, if public goods have positive (negative) direct distributional e¤ect, a higher (lower) level of public goods is needed to counteract the higher income inequality caused by capital mobility. Secondly, by considering heterogeneity both in capital income and labor income, the distributional e¤ect of labor taxation is strengthened by capital mobility, due to the fact that capital income and labor income are positively correlated. A less strong redistribution of capital income can be partly compensated by a stronger redistribution of labor income. This changes the intuition that public goods provision becomes more costly if they are only …nanced by capital taxation. In fact, it becomes less costly if labor taxation is also used to …nance public goods.
I show that if public goods have positive direct distributional e¤ect, there is a case for over-provision of public goods. More importantly, with positive correlation of capital income and labor income, providing public goods becomes less costly with capital mobility. Even if public goods have no direct distributional e¤ect, higher capital mobility would lead to a higher level of public goods.
One important assumption for the results of lower MCF with increasing capital mobility is the exclusion of lump-sum tax. If lump-sum tax is allowed, the MCF of …nancing public goods would be equal to 1 and the e¤ect of higher capital mobility depends only on the direct distributional e¤ect of public goods, i.e. higher capital mobility leads to a higher (lower) level of public goods if they bene…t high-income individuals less (more).
However, as long as lump-sum tax is not available, which is not an unreasonable assumption, our results remain valid. In particular, allowing for lump-sum transfer would not change our results either, because lump-sum transfer can be seen as one type of public goods with positive direct distributional e¤ect 9 . Ihori and Yang (2008) show that redistribution is reduced by capital mobility, but the optimal pubic goods provision is not changed. They allow for lump-sum tax to …nance public goods and they neither consider labor taxation nor the direct distributional e¤ect of public goods. Consequently, their results di¤er from ours in that public goods provision and redistribution can be separated in their setting.
Conclusion
This paper embeds both public goods provision and redistribution in a single model framework, and shows that preferences for income redistribution may alter the standard result of under-provision of public goods under tax competition. In a standard twocountry symmetric tax competition model, benevolent governments tax labor income and capital to …nance public goods. Public goods can bene…t low-income people more or less than high-income ones. Furthermore, capital income and labor income are positively correlated. Capital mobility increases the e¢ ciency costs of capital taxation and reduces the optimal capital tax rate. The more mobile capital is, the less capital income can be redistributed compared to labor income and the lower the level of income redistribution.
However, public goods can be used as an instrument to …ght against the increasing income inequality, as long as individuals with di¤erent income bene…t from public goods di¤erently. If public goods bene…t high-income earners more (less), a higher capital mobility calls for a lower (higher) level of public goods. Moreover, the marginal costs of …nancing public goods decrease as a result of positive correlation of capital income and labor income. In particular, a less strong redistribution of capital income can be partly compensated by a stronger redistribution of labor income. As a result, labor tax becomes less costly and the marginal costs of public funds decrease, which calls for a higher level of public goods.
Further research can be done for asymmetric countries. They may di¤er in their aggregate human capital and aggregate capital endowment or in their distributive preference. With asymmetric countries, the degree of redistribution would be a¤ected by the relative endowment and capital mobility could be bene…cial for one country.
A Appendix
A.1 Optimal policy I derive in this appendix the …rst-order conditions in section 3. The Lagrangian function for country A is
whereby A is the Lagrangian multiplier. If country A is capital exporting country, it is assumed that only one individual invests in foreign country, who bears the transaction costs A . His consumption is
which can be rewritten as
by using the equilibrium condition for capital market. For all other residents in country
A the consumption is
A.1.1 Labor tax:
The …rst-order-condition for labor tax rate t A is
By de…ning h cov(uc;h) E [uc] , it leads to equation (10).
A.1.2 Capital tax:
A marginal increase of capital tax rate a¤ects the wellbeing of the individual who invests in foreign country and all other individuals di¤erently, because the individual who invests in foreign country bears all transaction costs. Since it is assumed that there is a continuum of individuals, the e¤ect of changing capital tax rate on the wellbeing of the single individual who invests in foreign country can be ignored. The …rst-order-condition for capital tax rate is therefore
Equation (21) shows that the individual who invests in foreign country has a higher consumption of A than all other individuals. Assuming that there is only one investor investing in foreign country and therefore ignoring the welfare e¤ect of increasing capital tax rate on this individual means that the consumption increase of A can be ignored in the analysis. This implies that the net welfare costs of increasing capital tax rate is overestimated. However, the transaction costs associated with capital ‡ow, which would be caused by a marginal increase of capital tax rate in a symmetric equilibrium with no capital ‡ow, could not be very large. Note that the transaction costs must be lower than the interest di¤erence between the two countries. Therefore, ignoring the consumption increase of A does not a¤ect our result qualitatively 10 By de…ning the distributional characteristic of capital income as k = cov(uc;k) K E [uc] , I can rewrite the equation (25) as
Imposing symmetric Nash-equilibrium and substituting for K A = 1 in (26) lead to equation (11) in text.
A.1.3 Public goods:
The last …rst-order-condition is for public goods z:
Dividing both sides by E [u c ] and using u z = u c uz uc
, I can reformulate (27) as
which can be written as (14) after using the de…nition of z cov(uc;
as the distributional characteristic of public goods.
A.2 Comparative statics of optimal policy
A.2.1 Derive the comparative statics I derive in this Appendix the comparative statics of the optimal policy. The complete …rst-order-conditions of the governmental optimization problem (8) are
A :
I substitute for (29) in (30) to have
From (32) it can be written
Substituting for (34) and using the derivatives in symmetric equilibrium
Combining (31) and (32) leads to
I have therefore a two-equation-system
This equation system determines the optimal capital tax rate and the optimal level of public goods, and the optimal labor tax rate is pinned down by equation (34). The comparative statics of capital tax rate and public goods w.r.t the parameter can be derived by total di¤erentiation of the equation system (37):
Take the inverse of the matrix A 
Therefore, the comparative statics can be found to be
Because the MCF e¤ect of a higher capital tax rate is positive, the sign of the welfare e¤ect in (18) depends on the sign of z .
i) Public goods bene…t low-income individuals more ( z < 0): For this case the marginal willingness to pay for public goods uz uc decreases with private consumption.
Therefore, a higher capital tax rate decreases the marginal willingness to pay of low-income people, but increases the marginal willingness to pay of high-income 
